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MASTER'S THESIS

**Progressive divergence? The development
of Croatian and Slovenian strategic
cultures since independence.**

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the development of strategic culture in Slovenia and Croatia since independence. Croatia and Slovenia are small countries in the Western Balkans. Both countries became independent in 1991 and since then they became important regional actors in the Western Balkans. This thesis traces Slovenia and Croatia's historical position within the former SFR Yugoslavia's defence system. The empirical analysis in the thesis examines official documents of both countries to find basic notions of the strategic culture of Croatia and Slovenia. The thesis' research focuses on finding how both countries' goal of Euro-Atlantic integration influenced the development of their strategic culture.

Keywords: *Strategic Culture, Slovenia, Croatia*

DECLARATION:

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and literature listed in the appended bibliography. The thesis as submitted is 142.224 keystrokes long (including spaces), i.e. 82 manuscript pages.

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Matevž Vogrinec



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List of Abbreviations

Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2003 (ARMD 2003)
Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2005 (ARMD 2005)
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
Commission on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Declaration on the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DFPRS)
Defence Strategy 2012 (DS 2012)
Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (DSRC 2002)
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
European Union (EU)
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Kosovo Force (KFOR)
Membership Action Plan (MAP)
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia (MVEP)
National Strategy for Integration of the Republic of Slovenia into NATO (NSIRSN)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
NATO Headquarters in Skopje (NATO HQSk)
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
Partnership for Peace (PfP)
Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2015 (RGLTDEPSAF 2004)
Resolution on the Basis for a National Security Plan of the Republic (RBNSPRS)
Resolution on the General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces until 2025 (RGLTDEPSAF until 2025)
Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia from 2001 (RNSSRS 01)
Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia from 2010 (RNSSRS 2010)
Revised Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Defence for 2016 – 2018 (RSPMOD 16/18)
SFOR
Strategic Defence Review (SDR 2005)
Strategic Defence Review (SDR 2013)
Strategic Defence Review 2002/2003 with the vision until 2015 (SDR 02/03)
Strategic Defence Review 2009 (SDR 2009)
Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Defence for 2011 – 2013 (SPMOD 11/13)
Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Croatia 2002 (SNSRC 2002)
Strategy of the Participation of the Republic of Slovenia in International Operations and Mission (SPRSIOM)
Territorial Defence (TO)
United Nations (UN)
Yugoslav People's Army (YPA).

Introduction

The purpose of this master thesis is to analyse the development of strategic culture in Slovenia and Croatia since the countries became independent in 1991. The investigation starts with the SFR Yugoslavia's late period of the 1980s to establish the position of the political leadership of both countries in terms of relations, circumstances and roles of both republics in the defence sector of the SFR Yugoslavia. This will provide an overview of the defense situation before Slovenia and Croatia became independent countries. The main part of this thesis will be focused on the time period from 1991 to the present day. The analysis will offer wide and deep insight into the development of the strategic cultures in Slovenia and Croatia. Such insights can offer valuable perspectives in the future to understand the behaviour of these two very important countries for the Balkan peninsula. Both countries are today valuable partners of the West and its institutions. With an ongoing process of post-war stabilization both countries provide an important political surrounding to continue with an integration of the Balkan peninsula into a more stable political environment.

The Western Balkans today faces numerous difficulties in its political structure, as past events are still vivid and part of political debates and the collective memory of societies in the Western Balkans. The Western Balkans as a term became popular in recent times and describes the countries which were part of SFR Yugoslavia, except Slovenia (European Parliament, 2016). The Western Balkans lie at an interesting geographic position for multiple political and economic interests. Slovenia and Croatia both intensively take part in the Euro-Atlantic integration process. The role of Slovenia and Croatia is essential for further development of the region. This will also be an important part of my thesis as a lot of policy documents revolve around the international role of Slovenia and Croatia. The Slovenian role

in particular has become publicly recognized in recent years as a bridge between The Western Balkans and Europe.

Structure and methodology

In the first part of the thesis I will present the theoretical aspects of strategic culture. I will present numerous authors and their views on it. This will help to establish what strategic culture is and what its attributes are. The second part of the thesis will revolve around the historical perspective of SFR Yugoslavia's military doctrine and defense system. This part will present the conditions and behavior before Slovenia and Croatia became independent. This will also provide an introduction to the military positions of each country. By the constitution of SFR Yugoslavia, all of the six republics were sovereign, but as I will present later in my thesis, the republics had little authority over the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA).

The main part of my thesis will revolve around an analysis of official documents regarding the military and membership in the international organisations related to security or defence. The documents will be analysed with the method used by Jan Beneš and Tomáš Karasek in their article *Small and Vulnerable? Stability and Change in Strategic Culture of Visegrad Countries*. The method used in the article is an upgraded version of the method introduced by Cristoph O. Meyer. He was researching the European strategic cultures in the cases of the UK, France, Germany and Poland by introducing a method based on an analysis of four fields: goals of the use of force, preferred institutional framework, authorization of the use of force, and how the force is used (Meyer, 2006). Slovenia and Croatia share basic attributes with the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which were researched in Beneš and Karasek's article. All four countries were part of undemocratic systems after WW2. Slovenia and Croatia with their independence established a democratic political system and gained total control over the military and security sector.

The method presented in Beneš and Karasek's article is for these reasons equally relevant to my research. The research methodology per Beneš and Karasek is constructed on analysing four fields: "goal(s) of the use of force, definition of enemies and/or security threats, preferred institutional framework for the use of force, and the method of applying force." (Beneš and Karasek, 2016: 11). By analysing these four fields and comparing the results throughout the years and in the end, I will gain a deep insight into the development of strategic culture in Slovenia and Croatia. The analysis will be divided into three segments:

- 1991 – 2000
- 2000 – until the NATO accession
- post NATO accession period

In the last part of my thesis I will present the results of my analysis. The results of the analysis will offer a steady insight of how strategic communities in both countries shaped their domestic and international policies. With the given results, I will confirm or reject the thesis's hypothesis. The hypothesis is: The development of Slovenian and Croatian strategic culture after independence was heavily influenced by both countries' goals to achieve Euro-Atlantic integration. The specific situation of Slovenia and Croatia both can arguably be considered as small countries and in the crossway of numerous geopolitical interests. Both countries share a similar pathway to NATO membership with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Croatia's war for independence prolonged the process for the country, but at the same time Croatia is in a tight international relationship and has built a close relationship with numerous NATO members, such as Germany and France. Of course, the cooperation between NATO and Croatia was different during the independence war compared to NATO's cooperation with Slovenia. Nevertheless, close diplomatic and military ties were built with the international community and the first steps towards Euro-Atlantic integration were made.

The analysis of official documents and policies is not a priori only of strategic thinking, but for countries such as Slovenia and Croatia these official documents and policies are basically one of the rare products where one can define features of the strategic culture and its development.

The research mostly relies on primary sources such as military doctrines, strategies, documents made for international organisations such as NATO, and other official documentation. In the research are also included secondary sources to complement the official documents. This thesis aims to contribute a small part to the research of strategic culture in the Western Balkan through a hypothesis which is broad enough to encircle all of the circumstances surrounding the strategic culture and its development in Slovenia and Croatia and to find out how the Euro-Integration process influenced the development of the strategic culture of Slovenia and Croatia.

Strategic Culture: history, approaches and goals

The emphasis on security has become a hot topic for numerous debates. Different spheres of societies are directly affected by different policies which manage military and security challenges. Such policies can have not only national reach, but also international reach. In recent history, there were numerous security situations with a long-lasting effect not only for the particular country where the security incident happened. To understand how security policies are developed, spread and are negotiated one has to think in broader terms and encompass a multitude of factors. The concept of strategic culture has an interesting history with numerous understandings, definitions and perspectives. Strategic culture lacks one singular definition; to define strategic culture is close to impossible.

The strategic concept emerged from long a development which faced numerous obstacles and criticisms. In general, the majority of academics argue that there are three waves of strategic culture. These three waves offer different perspectives on what strategic culture is. According to Lantis the three waves of strategic culture research can be divided into phases. The first researched how policies and behaviour regarding the nuclear weapon are formatted. The second wave is a wave of constructivists and the third wave is focused on studying organisations and security norms (Lantis, 2006).

Culture and its influence on state behaviour were first researched after WW2. At first researchers in the 50's and 60s were focused on studying national characters, which could determine the behaviour of the nation itself (Lantis, 2006). As Lantis highlights, such an approach faced heavy criticism due to the obvious danger of stereotyping nations, but this fact did not stop some of the most prominent sociologists and anthropologists from continuing with their research of potential links between culture and behaviour. Later studies moved in the direction of researching the political culture under the perspective of sociology, but these theories were complex and basically offered little to no progress in understanding behaviour as the result of culture (Lantis, 2006).

Regardless of the previously mentioned issues and challenges, the first author to create a coherent concept of strategic culture was Jack Snyder in 1977. He was the first to use the name strategic culture, the first who wrote about its features, and the first author who used this concept in an actual case study. In his book, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*, he tried to use the strategic culture concept to predict the actions of the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear policy and nuclear doctrine. Snyder defined strategic culture as follows: "Strategic culture can be defined as the sum total

of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.” (Snyder, 1977:8). Snyder argues that strategic culture not only inhabits individuals, but more importantly occupies the organisation itself. His attempt to predict under what circumstances the Soviet Union would use nuclear weapons also brought an interesting perspective to the concept. He argues that new technologies and their usage are based on pre-existing strategic culture, which can heavily influence the development of new doctrines and policies on the use of new technologies (Snyder, 1977). Therefore, Snyder believes that the principle on the use of new technologies is shaped by the strategic culture which was already in existence and not solely by the newly formed organisations, which were introduced by the officials to regulate the usage of new technologies (Snyder, 1977). The first-generation research of strategic culture argued that strategic culture is developed through the elites in society. The elites influence policies, but individuals develop patterns of behaviour and thinking through the process of socialisation (Lantis, 2006).

Snyder’s theoretical approach is recognized as the first wave in contemporary academia. Although his focus was entirely on the usage of nuclear weapons and surveyed the strategic community in the USSR and the US, Snyder provided a promising concept for international relations research. The promising concept became the subject of research for Colin Gray in 1981. Gray is considered one of the most important authors on strategic culture. In his article *National Style in Strategy: The American Example*, Gray argued that previous works which were researching the strategic culture concept were not as Gray termed original scholarship (Gray, 1981). In his article Gray identifies potential benefits of strategic culture in four claims: “an improved understanding of our own, and other, cultures on their own terms; an improved ability to discern enduring policy motivations and thereby to predict

possible actions; an improved ability to communicate what we wish to communicate (whatever that may be); an improved ability to comprehend the meaning of events in the assessment of others.” (Gray, 1981: 22-23).

The potential benefits of understanding and researching the strategic culture were identical to Snyder’s potential goals in his work. Gray also provided a definition that does not much differentiate within strategic culture.

“That culture referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization (e.g., as an American, what am I, how should I feel, think, and behave?), and from all of the many distinctively American experiences (of geography, political philosophy, of civic culture, and "way of life") that characterize an American citizen.” (Gray, 1981: 22).

Gray’s definition of strategic culture has identical features to Snyder’s. Gray defined strategic culture around national identity and history. He took into account how identity influences an individual through the process of self-characterization and combined it with the historical experience of the American nation. These two features Gray presented as the most influential in sharpening the strategic culture.

After the initial onset, strategic culture faced a predicament. The first generation’s work focused around nuclear weapons and policies dealing with them. The geopolitical situation after the USSR dissolved changed significantly. The strategic culture concept was waiting for new research and approaches. The rise of constructivism gave the strategic culture a fresh point of view and a new perspective for research. Constructivists focused on social structures within the system and in what roles norms function in international security (Lantis, 2006). Alexander Wendt in his article *Collective Identity Formation and the International State*, researched the interaction between collective identity and the

international state. Wendt argued that the realist and rationalist approaches have flaws in that they see the distribution of material power as a key component in structural change. The presumption that the distribution of material power brings structural change cannot see beyond shifts in the political polarity and ignores the possibility of individuals to influence and bring about systematic changes (Wendt, 1994).

Constructivists are interested in how structure is formulated and how actors' behaviour is influenced by identity. Modern constructivists (such as Wendt), do not ignore material power, but argue that its role is produced by structure and identity, and is therefore not absolute (Kogoj, 2016). Constructivists' research led to probably the most fruitful generation of strategic culture yet. The later constructivist view of strategic culture became connected with the EU's integration process and governance of the EU. The second generation of research is known as the critical generation. The researches in the second generation had a common denominator in critical social theory. The research agenda was focused on global issues, critiquing the research of national characters and how the strategic culture is produced (Tellis, Szalwinski and Wills, 2016). The second-generation scholars focus was to reveal the backgrounds influencing on the development of the strategic culture. This interest was either global or national orientated.

The critical generation questioned the first generation's research agenda in terms of what the object of research should be. Not only did the second generation critically approach the research agenda of the previous generation, it also offered a new perspective on why one should also research the social structures in the background of the research. Therefore, the typical first-generation's link between national characters and behaviour was criticised by the critical second-generation scholars as this link did not incorporate the social construction of the national character and other relationships between the actors on the global scale (Lock, 2010 and Tellis, Szalwinski and Wills, 2016).

Contrary to the second generation, the third generation has plenty of different research approaches and perspectives. If the second generation's period can be named as a constructivist period, the third generation cannot be put into a single theoretical perspective. The research done in the third-generation resorts to the concept of strategic culture in order to better understand national or international organisations, integration into such organisations and policies connected with the state behaviour in terms of security forces. In 1995 Alastair Iain Johnston released his book *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Johnston's research is driven to determine how realpolitik's behaviour is created and shaped. This book is one of the most significant works on strategic culture and its influence on research. The development of the strategic culture concept can be compared to Snyder's work. Johnston created a complex model of strategic culture. His model was significantly different from any other theretofore known model. His main argument is that strategic culture is an independent variable and behaviour is dependent on culture. His notion of strategic culture is heavily positivistic (Kogoj, 2016). Johnston's epistemological strain is a positivistic one, but he defined strategic culture in symbolic and discursive terms, therefore Johnston was a constructivist in the ontological sense.

Johnston published an article in 1995 called *Thinking about Strategic Culture* in which he provided a literature review and enumerated the difficulties the concept of strategic culture encounters. The article's main goal is to present research challenges such as object of analysis, methodological problems and theoretical inconsistency within strategic culture. Moreover, Johnston also points out that strategic culture is not necessarily always measurable (Johnston, 1995). The complexity with which Johnston seems to have led his research is remarkable. It seems Johnston believed the majority of the previously released work on strategic culture was rather incomplete in terms of theoretical persistence and identifying the downsides of known theoretical models. Nonetheless he warns about the danger of strategic

culture becoming a tool by which stereotypes are further reproduced and the results of such research thusly influencing decision makers to create policies based on stereotypes because the research methodology was not adequate for the purpose of the research (Johnston, 1995). Johnston's definition of strategic culture is built on Geert's definition of culture, which he also mentions in *Thinking about Strategic Culture*. Johnston defines strategic culture as: "an integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious." (Johnston, 1995: 36 – 37).

The reason Johnston differentiates culture from behaviour lies in Geertz's view of culture. Geertz defines culture as a: "system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life." (Geertz in Johnston, 1995: 44).

A sparkling debate happened between Colin Gray and Johnston in the 1990s. Colin Gray wrote a reply to Johnston's separation of culture from behaviour. and Gray imposed an argument that everything we do is within the context of culture. The behaviour of strategic culture has an effect on any strategic behaviour. To back up this claim, Gray uses the example of Maritime Britain from 1916 until 1918 (Gray, 1999). The third generation of strategic culture brings new thinking and theoretical models of strategic culture, built either on criticism of the first generation or the process of development of the concept itself as new challenges in the field of international security occurred.

It is impossible to determine what strategic culture is built in a singular manner. The debate among academics is still ongoing and probably will last for some time in the future.

However, this does not mean strategic culture as a concept is not credible to use as a tool for research. Nevertheless, strategic culture is a concept which still awaits further research and usage, but at the same time it already offers a credible theoretical tool of analysis if the objective of analysis and methodology is appropriately set.

For my thesis, I will understand the strategic culture according to the first generation. This means that I search for culture everywhere. For the purpose of my research I presume that the official policies dealing with development of domestic and international policies and long-term goals of behaviour are the result of the existing strategic community in Slovenia and Croatia. The documents analysed in the thesis are prepared in stable and peaceful times. Some of them were prepared at the times when Slovenia and Croatia were still both candidates for NATO membership and some of them when Slovenia and Croatia were already NATO members. Thus, I presume the position and goals in those documents are direct reflections of the conditions and mindset in the strategic community of Slovenia and Croatia. The analysis conducted with an understanding that analysed documents are a direct result of the strategic community will deliver valid results as both countries had a steady and stable political development since independence. Croatia's independence war lasted from 1991 until 1995. The Croatian documents analysed are all younger, meaning they were the result of stable and peaceful times. I will search for culture everywhere to find the most basic notions of strategic culture in Slovenia and Croatia. Several factors contribute to this decision. First, Slovenia and Croatia are not big or important countries from the position of geopolitical interests as long as these two countries remain stable and peaceful. The smallness of these countries, both in geographical size and military power leads to the reality that there has basically been no research done which would offer any conclusion or definition of strategic culture for Slovenia and Croatia. Therefore, I will search for strategic culture in

official documents, official strategies and secondary resources. The barrier of searching for the strategic culture also exists in research for other countries bigger than Slovenia and Croatia, but is small if compared to countries such as Germany or the United Kingdom. This obstacle does not prevent me from researching strategic culture under the first-generation perspective. Especially because my research is focused on finding how strategic culture developed across the official documents, where one can trace opinions and principles of strategic community in official policies.

SFR Yugoslavia, common ground of problems for Slovenian and Croatian strategic culture

After WWI, Slovenia and Croatia were part of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, later renamed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In 1929, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was formed. In WWII Slovenia was technically still a part of the Yugoslav kingdom, but Croatia declared independence in 1941. The newly formed state was called the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). After the Communists prevailed in Yugoslavia and defeated Fascism, a new country was formed, named the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. SFR Yugoslavia included six components: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, as well as two the autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo. The newly-established socialist country, positioned in an important geopolitical space after the World War II, found a third way after Tito and Stalin split in 1948. Yugoslavia was never considered among the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

The image of SFR Yugoslavia was always important for Josip Broz Tito, the president of SFR Yugoslavia (Bernik, 2006). Politically SFR Yugoslavia after 1948 never embraced Joseph Stalin's idea of communism. The clash between the Soviet Union and the SFR

Yugoslavia or clash between Tito and Stalin is known as the Informbiro period. Stalin's idea to organize an international body of communist parties emerged in 1947 and lasted until 1955. The Informbiro was a successor of the Comintern. The pressure from the Soviet Union did not break the SFR Yugoslavia and its stand on how the revolution should be carried on in the postwar period (Kovač, 2006).

The Informbiro period served as a reminder that SFR Yugoslavia needed a strong military capability in order to defend itself from a foreign threat. This was later internalized in propaganda as "internal and external enemies never rest". Josip Broz Tito never forgot to mention how the Yugoslav need to nurture the "brotherhood and unity" of the nations living in SFR Yugoslavia. The military sector carried a lot of responsibility and power. Nonetheless, the YPA and foreign policy of SFR Yugoslavia were two sectors of the country over which Josip Broz Tito was not willing to negotiate about his views and stances (Reberšak, 2015). This shows how utterly important the YPA was for the country and position. Republics of Slovenia and Croatia thus had no influence over the military as all the decisions were made in Belgrade by Tito.

The military doctrine of SFR Yugoslavia nevertheless provides a better insight into the positions of Slovenia and Croatia. Yugoslavia had a well-prepared scenario of total defence, encompassing both military and civil sectors. Such a concept of defence is appropriate for crises, which have been present for a longer period of time (Šuligoj, 2011). This concept was also taught at the university level with the goal of students to study the defence system and functions of the country (Jelušić, 1991). The concept of total defence even had its own legislation in SFR Yugoslavia. The concept was called Total national defence and social self-protection of SFRY. The concept was inspired by Marx's idea of an

armed proletariat population. The introduction of this concept was linked to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Lipič, 2016). Until 1968 the YPA was the singular armed force in SFR Yugoslavia. After 1968 the communist party added the territorial defence (teritorialna obramba – TO) as a new armed force (Marijan, 2009). “With the invasion [of Czechoslovakia] the democratic processes in the Eastern European socialist camp were brought to a standstill. This also had an effect on the conditions in Slovenia and the SFR Yugoslavia. Czech socialism by the means of man forced the SFR Yugoslavia’s leadership to come up with some reforms in order to stay recognized as the most democratic socialist country” (Bernik, 2006: 66).

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had two dimensions for SFR Yugoslavia. The first dimension was the democratic processes which were put in stagnation at best and the second dimension was the awareness of SFR Yugoslavia role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) along with the awareness the country needs not only the classic military defense, but also a civil resistance, which would not be centralized as the YPA was (Bernik, 2006). The involvement of civilians in defensive tasks was supported by influential politicians in SFR Yugoslavia such as Edvard Kardelj together with some of the YPA’s generals. The support of territorial defence were perceived by these politicians and military generals as a need for the Yugoslav people to encompass the experience of their resistance during World War 2 (Kocijan in Bolfek, 2010).

SFR Yugoslavia prepared a total defence concept on two major actors. One was YPA, in which the decision-making process was organised on the federal level and the other was the civilian field. Territorial defence was organised at the level of each socialist republic on its own. The third, and a minor actor, was units organised by third parties such as companies (Bolfek, 2010).

Even though TO was some sort of military reserve, YPA found competing elements in it and recognized TO as an alternative under which republics could organise a military independent from the federal government and the YPA. The field of military was another internal battlefield of Yugoslavia. Competing concepts of socialism and Yugoslavia emerged in the military field too. In the 70's the YPA reorganized the leaderships of TO's in socialist republics, but the spirit and idea of TO's was not overthrown by it. (Kučan, 1998).

The common ground between Slovenia and Croatia that interests me for this thesis is to present the dependency of Slovenia and Croatia from SFR Yugoslavia's federal government. This dependency, as showed later, had a big impact on the development of strategic culture as both countries had to build their respective military systems first, as prior the strategic communities in both countries had not been independent and had to encompass the dictates not only from the federal government, but also from the YPA's leadership. This fact brings a minor chaos to the official documents regarding doctrines or strategies. Both governments had to first create and organize militaries and not just transform them from militaries of authoritarian regimes into modern militaries while respecting democratic rights and new structures and political dynamics in Slovenia and Croatia. The problems Slovenia and Croatia faced in the time of war in Yugoslavia were similar.

Slovenia and Croatia's capability to organize defense units and prepare for war were limited, but at the same time the experience with the Yugoslav military doctrine contributed to the overall ability to organize and prepare for an armed conflict with the YPA. Such scenario was always in mind with the high ranking YPA's officials. Nevertheless, YPA was one of the pillars of SFR Yugoslavia and had a severe influence on federal politics. The effort of YPA's officials to prevent the growing reputation and influence of TO's in their respective republics was enormous.

The development of strategic culture in Slovenia and Croatia was therefore limited as officially Slovenia and Croatia as federal states had no influence on the key questions regarding the military sector in the period before TO was introduced. The introduction of TO was implemented by the total defence doctrine and with the internal political circumstances in the SFR Yugoslavia, although these changes were partially revoked in the 1970's (Kučan, 1998). These changes as argued previously presented the opportunity for Slovenia and Croatia to organize their defensive forces. These defensive forces were not typical military units; Slovenia's and Croatia's inability to create a military and haunted both countries as we will see later when they declared independency and transformed TO unit into the proper military. This transformational process was therefore a challenging one for Slovenia and Croatia and because of it both countries faced difficulties creating official policies as first they needed to create the military system itself.

When the president of SFR Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito died, the command of the YPA shifted from the Presidium of SFR Yugoslavia to a federal secretary of national defense (Marijan, 2009). TO's in Slovenia and Croatia faced identical problems when internal political fights in SFR Yugoslavia began. These tensions at the time brought numerous commands from the federal level to a state level. The disarmament of Slovenian and Croatian TO's remains an ongoing political debate in both countries. In Slovenia, the TO's disarmament reoccurred in the political discourse in 2011, when numerous prominent figures involved in the Slovenian independence process accused Milan Kučan who served as the President of the Presidency of Slovenia in the 1990 when the disarmament occurred, that he was aware of the disarmament process, but did not proceed to counter it. Kučan denied such accusation and explained there are documents proving he reacted at the time (Delo, 2011). Nevertheless, the disarmament of TO's by the YPA is most likely a never ending political debate as it provides a lot of room for speculation and interpretation.

Problems with creating a military system were not only revolving around the position of Slovenia and Croatia within the political system of SFR Yugoslavia. These problems can be best presented with the case of Slovenian TO and Slovenian's society relationship with the YPA. In general Slovenians had less interest to enter the military schools due to numerous circumstances such as the use of the Serbo-Croatian language of lectures in these schools. In the YPA it was also not encouraged to seek formal education. The enrollment in higher education programs was discouraged up to the point that one could argue it was practically forbidden (Bernik, 2006). YPA's relationship with the TO was dynamic and mirrored the existing interests within the SFR Yugoslavia. It seems that these interests, which in the case of TO had an interest in restructuring the power structure of SFR Yugoslavia in terms of (partial) decentralization of the government. Major changes were not possible as the country was firmly controlled by Josip Broz Tito and his close allies. One of the shifts that carried changes was the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The repercussion of the Czechoslovakian situation opened a new sphere of influence of republics. This new sphere became a battlefield of ideas about the positions of individual nations in SFR Yugoslavia. The new constitution presented by Josip Broz Tito in 1974 was a result of the internal struggles of the SFR Yugoslavia's political system.

The new constitution addressed not only the self-managing model of socialism for which SFR Yugoslavia was recognized as a unique socialistic country, but also established the management of its defence forces and provided a mechanism how SFR Yugoslavia will politically function after Tito's death. To better understand the differences between the YPA and TO I will present the key features of both structures. Both evolved from a different background with different responsibilities. The key features of YPA identified by Marijan were:

- “YPA was technically and financially superior to the TO, but the TO was stronger in numbers. TO was also organized and trained for standalone actions or joint military actions with the YPA.
- The YPA’s development was under the close supervision of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
- After World War 2 the YPA was a pillar of defence of SFR Yugoslavia. In the 80’s the YPA presented itself as the only institution which still held the true values of SFR Yugoslavia. The League of communists of Yugoslavia held high respect for YPA. The respect gained by winning World War 2 helped the YPA to gain a better position within the political system when internal struggles were present.
- In the post-war period, the YPA was organized like the Soviet Union’s Red Army. It adopted also the doctrine of the Red Army. Later its organizational structure changed according to the influences of West and East.
- The YPA’s position of balancing the both blocs also was reflected in the military equipment the YPA had. The SFR Yugoslavia’s military did not meet the standards of the militaries from the West and East.
- The management and command system is divided into two-time periods. One was Tito’s period and the other was the period after his death in 1980.
- In 1974 the newly introduced SFR Yugoslavia’s constitution dealt with the management system of the YPA. The new management system should bring more equal representation of the six republics and two autonomous regions, but the constitution’s spirit never lived up” (Marijan in Reberšak, 2015: 37-38).

The complicated political picture and extremely complicated political system of the SFR Yugoslavia are contributing factors to why the constitution from 1974 was never implemented in parts which talk about the management of the YPA. As mentioned previously, the YPA's function as the Yugoslav institution which carries on the values and the message of the revolution brought the political aspect to the YPA. Slovenia and Croatia were never trusted entirely as the YPA's mindset about the political leadership of Slovenia and Croatia was always in a negative stance and the political leadership of both countries were seen as problematic due to the official and unofficial positions of both of the same leadership in matters perceived by the federal government and the YPA as more concerning. The more concerning matters and affairs were especially those which involved political dissidents or the matters which were seen as potentially endangering the socialist revolution and the idea of SFR Yugoslavia. That is why when the TO's system of people defence against the aggression was introduced the YPA had many concerns about it. The most concerning for the YPA and the federal government were TO's characteristic that TO was funded by the republic and also organized by the republic. For Slovenia and Croatia this element of the SFR Yugoslavia's military sector was the only possibility one to develop some behaviour which one could categorize as belonging to strategic culture. TO's were important for Slovenia and Croatia as this was the closest organization with military attributes that Slovenia and Croatia's political leadership managed. Before the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia the political leadership of Slovenia and Croatia dealt with their own TO in similar ways. The countermeasures of the YPA were for both countries identical. The political leadership acted as some sort of double agents. At the same time, they were dealing with the situation within their own republics where movements for SFR Yugoslavia's decentralization

were occurring (in other words movements were fighting for greater independency of the federal states from Belgrade)¹.

The role of the YPA in the recentralizing process was a very important one. Nonetheless, the YPA as the single military of the SFR Yugoslavia had a lot of interests in centralization in order to gain more political power and to diminish the position of TO's within the various socialist republics (Guštin, 2008). The YPA's position after Josip Broz Tito's death was caught in a predicament. The powerful position the YPA had once held became endangered by the attempts at decentralization. The decentralization agenda was especially powerful in the economically stronger republics. Slovenia and Croatia held the position of the most economically developed socialist republics in SFR Yugoslavia. (Guštin, 2008).

Throughout the 80's these movements were facing prosecution, but the political leadership in Slovenia for example managed to pursue such activities very mildly². The political leadership in Slovenia and Croatia had to deal with the federal government of the SFR Yugoslavia on the other side. The pressure from the YPA and Serbia's leadership grew. Events that follow in the late 80's showed how SFR Yugoslavia after Josip Broz Tito was not able to adequately deal with internal problems and struggles. The escalation which Serbian leadership caused in pretending they were acting to defend SFR Yugoslavia's revolution and people overflowed beyond the political sphere. The pressure from Serbia created numerous minor political fights, which later evolved into a political fight with unprecedented importance for SFR Yugoslavia. Prime example of such fights are the strikes of Kosovar miners. The

¹ Slovenian magazines such as Mladina and Nova revija published important articles which contributed to the

² In the late 1980's the JBTZ affair happened in Slovenia in which aftermath the Mladina's journalist Janez Janša was arrested by the YPA, because the Slovenian leadership decided not to prosecute his article in which he published the YPA's document. While he was in jail a support movement gathered at the building where the jail was located.

In the cultural field, the Slovenian culture movement NSK also came under the attention due to its provocative messages and provocations of the regime. Novi kolektivizem a group within the NSK movement edited the Nazi propaganda poster, which was later chosen as the official poster for the Youth day in 1987. The Youth day was a celebration of the Tito's birthday.

Serbian political leadership at the time was already in the hands of the charismatic leader Slobodan Milošević. The protest in Kosovo was a direct result of Milošević's politics vis a vis Kosovo and a result of neglect of the region itself by the federal government of SFR Yugoslavia.

Milošević as a populist set his agenda in Kosovo on historical myths. His agenda to subordinate the autonomous region of Kosovo started unexpectedly and by chance. In 1987, Milošević was sent to Kosovo to attend meetings with local leaders of Serbs living in Kosovo. The crowd started to protest against the position of Serbs living in Kosovo. The crowd also initiated a few minor incidents with the police. Milošević, facing the crowd and the crowd's accusations on how they are victims of police violence, responded with the unprecedented answer: "You will not be beaten again!" (Vujačić in Klepec, 2002 and Klepec 2002).

This kind of rhetoric was a harbinger of things to come for the Serbian leadership. It was clear that Kosovo was the most important site for Serbian nationalism and for the same reasons it was needed to establish control over the Serbian leadership. Milošević managed to do this and then made a huge career leap from an office bureaucrat to a very important political figure at the federal level of SFR Yugoslavia. The Kosovo protests in 1989 were a continuation of the immiscible politics of SFR Yugoslavia in Kosovo. Milošević prior to the miners' protest installed political leadership of Kosovo's communist party. The protest was upheld by the Slovenian and Croatian political leadership. (Klepec, 2002). Milošević's agenda continued and its nationalistic agenda in which Serbs were depicted as victims and Slovenians and Albanians were shown as separatists who want to destroy the strong and powerful country of SFR Yugoslavia. This led Slovenia and Croatia to create an initiative in order to counterbalance Serbia's pact with Montenegro. The initiative never resulted in practice due to the unstable political environment and sudden changes which faced the SFR

Yugoslavia. The coalition between Slovenia and Croatia was not carefully planned; it was a coalition by chance and need (Repe in Guštin, 2008 and Guštin 2008). Pressure from Belgrade did not stop at Kosovo. Later the same type of pressure applied to all the member republics who were losing political influence due to the newly introduced reforms. Pressure was not only applied through official political channels, but also through the YPA.

Slovenian leadership had multiple meetings with the YPA to provide answers for the Slovenian public criticism of the YPA about the financing and plans of development of the YPA (Repe in Reberšak, 2015). The YPA's response which, without a doubt, was also supported by the Serbian political leadership, was to disarm the Slovenian and Croatian TO. Slovenia and Croatia responded to this with political actions and in the end prepared their own armed forces to defend the country from the YPA's military actions. This pressure from the YPA symbolises the problems with the position of the YPA itself within the SFR Yugoslavia. The smaller republics were not given an equal position in managing the YPA and the YPA fought against plans of decentralization or as Slovenia and Croatia discussed, the plan for confederacy (Guštin, 2008). The only experience Slovenia and Croatia acquired in terms of the state defence was through organising the TO and the state police (milica). Their roles in managing the YPA as presented in this chapter were limited and the same influence was reduced due to the political fights, especially after Tito's death which opened up a space for new internal political fights for the YPA as the YPA was under the complete control of Tito. The new model of power made in 1974's constitution was also partially responsible for Slovenian and Croatian lack of influence in the political model of the SFR Yugoslavia after Tito's death and the empowerment of Milošević's political agenda. These factors on the whole, surrounded Slovenia and Croatia with many obstacles, which prevented both countries from having the developed system and logic in the defence sector.

The position of TO's from the SFR Yugoslavia and the long lasting political fight for influence over the decision-making process of the TO's helped both countries, because different leaderships of both countries created a pool of knowledge over the military sector through the system of TO's. Even if this knowledge was limited as in the knowledge itself and in the experiences, it contributed to the strategic communities of both countries, which started to develop in both countries when they became independent. More importantly, this pool of knowledge was inherited over the years as the political agenda for the TO's of both countries did not change significantly.

When SFR Yugoslavia dissolved, the result was a long lasting civil war in the region, which lasted from 1991 until 1995 for Croatia and for 10 days in 1991 for Slovenia. Both countries were part of the same defence structure and logic in the SFR Yugoslavia, but both countries had extremely different experiences with the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This fact impacts the position of Slovenian and Croatian militaries in the 90's. The process of creating strategic goals for the military was not fast. In contrast to other countries with a similar historical background, the military of Slovenia had no strategic guidelines, which would be official. The only official and publicly known document which talks about the military doctrine of the Slovenian military is the document about the military doctrine of the Slovenian army, but this document was only partially published without the consent of the Slovenian Ministry of Defence. The document remains unavailable. The Croatian military shared the official policymaking process with Slovenia. The first publicly available documents can be seen in the beginning of the 2000's. For the purpose of my analysis the analysis includes the documents from the 2000's until 2017. Documents regarding military strategy and doctrine cannot be traced sooner in the 1990's. Unavailability of such documents is connected with the Croatian independence war. This gap in information is not fatal for the research of

Croatian strategic culture, because secondary sources are analysed instead of official documents. Therefore, the information gap is incorporated in the structure of empirical analysis that is structured by periods and not by years.

Time after the independence

Independence and secession of both Slovenia and Croatia from the SFR Yugoslavia was declared on 25. 6. 1991. The path towards independence was in many aspects similar. Especially during the period before the independence war, the trail and collaboration as mentioned previously was mutually supportive of the common goal of independence for Slovenia and Croatia. (Guštin, 2008). After both countries declared independence, the Brijuni conference was held by the federal government. The European delegation met with the officials from Yugoslavia to seek a diplomatic solution for the present situation (Government Communication Office, 2017). At this conference, the agreement was reached that Slovenia and Croatia freeze all the activities related to the declaration of the independence. However, the Brijuni agreement had no effect on the already declared independence, nor did the agreement speak in retroactive language, meaning both countries became independent on the 25. 6. 1991 (Rudolf, 2013). At the Brijuni conference the similar path of Slovenia and Croatia ended. Each country departed into its own direction that was a result of exterior processes and circumstances. These exterior processes and circumstances did not have just a regional dimension, but an international one as well.

Bilateral collaboration of Slovenia and Croatia ended quickly when the time to address the question of independence on the international floor. This happened due to the Brijuni agreement in which Slovenia negotiated the departure of the YPA forces from

Slovenian territory. This fact played to the advantage of Slovenia as the war in Slovenia was over and the Slovenian diplomacy had acted rapidly to seek the international recognition of Slovenian independence. The problem Slovenia faced was Croatia as the international community bundled together the Slovenian and Croatian problem. In that time, the Foreign minister of Slovenia Dimitrij Rupel proposed a solution for the rest of the SFR Yugoslavia. He proposed that Slovenia become independent (recognized by the international community) and the rest of the countries including Croatia remain in SFR Yugoslavia, which would be organised as a confederation, but practically the plan suggested that the SFR Yugoslavia would remain a country with federal states. This was of course not accepted by the Croatian side (Repe in Guštin, 2008 and Guštin, 2008).

The search for a diplomatic solution in the Balkans lasted for months. At the same time, the situation in the Balkans did not stagnate or stabilise. Problems with armed incidents in Croatia continued even though the Brijuni agreement stated the clear goals and behaviour of each actor involved. The Brijuni conference was a milestone in terms of the recent history of Slovenia and Croatia. For Slovenia, the Brijuni agreement lead the country to a new path of independency gained through the Ten Days War. In contrast to the Slovenian future, Croatia's future looked less promising for the independence to be upheld without a major conflict.

The research analyses the documents which will reveal how the strategic culture developed over time. The examined documents are from different areas of statehood that are dealing with the strategic policies in Slovenia and Croatia. The documents in question are laws regarding defence, foreign policies, strategic documents about defence and national security. Neither of the countries in vogue did have any major strategic documents *per se*

until the early 2000's. The analysis could thus rely only on secondary sources which, however, deal mostly with the typology of war conducted in Slovenia and Croatia, the chronology of the war itself, types of armed units used in war etc. Deeper analysis of the mid- and late 1990's period was thus problematic since any major documents were simply non-existent. There were three more general documents produced in Slovenia and one in Croatia. An analysis of the documents from the 1990's will serve in the analysis to examine the pillars of the strategic development. On the other hand, after 2000 both countries produced a lot of documents. This production can be attributed to the integrational processes both Slovenia and Croatia were part of and which required them to officially and openly declare their strategic positions.

Why were major strategic documents absent in the 1990's? The answer has a lot to do with the challenges the process of development of the strategic culture faced in Slovenia and Croatia. One could argue that even though any major strategic documents are non-existent, the strategic culture in both countries certainly was developed to a reasonable point. As I have presented earlier in this thesis, both countries were experienced in setting up long-lasting strategic goals. Croatia's situation in the 1990's was a significant period in their history. That decade is forever marked in Croatian history due to the human casualties of the war and economic deprivation the war for independence produced. Croatia's political leadership at the time was more occupied with fighting the war and after the war ended with the stabilization of the country. The process of rebuilding the country was also very demanding and a lot of primary state systems had to be reorganized and restarted. Even if the political leadership did not put manpower into the creation of strategic documents and creating written long-term agendas for the defence and security connected issues, it is still evident that the strategic community was existent and present as the diplomatic efforts were enormous and as presented later the processes of European integration and joining NATO

started quickly after the country was stable enough to do so. The process of creating some policies was not completely frozen. One can trace some principles in Croatian foreign policy after the war. The foreign policy was focused on reestablishing ties with the allies of Croatia who were supportive of Croatia in the war. At the same time Croatian foreign policy had to deal with the Serbian aggressor in a variety of fields. Croatia throughout the wartime period sought opportunities to establish diplomatic and economic ties with European partners (Vukadinović, 1996).

The system to produce strategic documents in Croatia was established when the new government came into power in 2000. The new government established the agenda by which the ministries would create the documents needed in their field of operation. This means that not only the strategic documents related to military and security sector were created, but basically all the ministries were creating strategies for their own field (Mahečić, 2010). Croatia's reform process at the time was not proceeding smoothly. Especially the defence sector reform was gradual and sometimes clashed with the legislation. At the time, the legislation was not adequate for the needs of the defence sector, but at the same time the strategies prepared for the defence sector were proceeding in a positive direction for the international partners of the republic of Croatia. The most important partner in that process was NATO with which Croatia signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in May 2000 and later in 2002 the Membership Action Plan (MAP) (Jazbec, 2005 and Mahečić, 2010).

According to Vukadinović and Čehulić, the problems with the Croatian foreign policy in the 1990's lay in the influence of president Franjo Tuđman. His narrative brought the foreign policymaking process into the political delegation of tasks rather than the normal process

where multiple actors are involved in the creation of such a document (Vukadinović and Čehulić, 2001).

The Slovenian defence sector faced its own troubles too. The uncomprehensive political approach towards the defence sector brought instability to it. This instability showed itself in the encirclement of the defence sector with the multiple affairs for which the ministers of defence kept resigning one after another amid public pressure. It was not until the year of 2000 when the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia became stabilised (Jelušić, 2007). Instability within the Ministry of Defence applied itself through the confusion on what pillars the Slovenian defence system should be built. Nonetheless, there were some documents produced, but the content of these documents was unsatisfactory from many angles (Fekonja in Križmančič, 2002). The situation at the Ministry of Defence at the time did not result in taking care of the long-term perspectives of the Slovenian army. The minister of defence dr. Anton Grizold (2000 – 2004) gave his critical perspective on the past happening in the ministry. He argued that the Slovenian defence system was built in confusion without any true strategy or clear future vision nor coherence (Grizold in Križmančič, 2002).

While the Slovenian defence sector in the 1990's was in confusion as Jelušić argued, the Slovenian Ministry for Foreign Affairs as another branch of important strategic decision making established itself on different grounds. The purpose of the foreign policy in the 1990's at first was to establish relationships with the international community along with building an image of how the country should be identified (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič, 2013). This was important for obvious reasons. Slovenia's independence was fresh and as already pointed out previously in this thesis (see Reberšak) the country itself did not have any

tradition in terms of foreign relations. Furthermore, the diplomacy of SFR Yugoslavia did not appoint Slovenian citizens to the most prominent diplomatic positions (Rupel, Trekman, Jazbec and Golob, 2000). Other data speaks for itself as well. According to Rupel, Trekman, Jazbec and Golob, the foreign policy was predominantly Serbian. “Before the dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia 54% of the personnel at the SFR Yugoslavia’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs was Serbian by nationality” (Rupel, Trekman, Jazbec and Golob, 2000:2).

The fresh independence brought an enormous task before the diplomats and politics. Considering the wider picture of the early 1990’s a lot of political processes happened in the former Eastern bloc. The role of Slovenian diplomacy and thus the foreign policy was to create the new image of Slovenia without any constraints from the past. Slovenia wanted to distinguish itself from the image of the country belonging to the Balkans due to the bad image the Balkans had at the time with the ongoing civil war (Patterson in Bojinović Fenko and Šabič, 2013 and Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2013).

Slovenia and Croatia constituted their foreign policies on different grounds, but the goals were quite similar. The European Union in the 1990’s set up a diverse approach towards Slovenia and Croatia (Rodin, 1995). Siniša Rodin in his article *Foreign Policy of the European Union and the Republic of Croatia* gives two conclusions regarding the orientation of Croatia towards the EU. The first one is realising the EU is not a “monolithic” structure, thus Croatia needs to work with the individual EU member states and not only on the EU level. The second conclusion is that Croatia needs to establish a lobby in Brussels to achieve its goals (Rodin, 1995).

International cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration has its roots in political history of Slovenia and Croatia. An interesting aspect is given by Radovan Vukadinović that the unique

political position of the SFR Yugoslavia cannot be repeated due to the fact that the only future for the former socialist republics is European integration (Vukadinović, 1993).

The unique perspective of the SFR Yugoslavia by which Josip Broz Tito led the country throughout the Cold War will not repeat as Vukadinović highlights. For Slovenia and Croatia, the only natural goal after independency was to push for European integration and became a relevant partner in the region. This is also clearly stated in the document prepared by the Slovenian Ministry for Foreign Affairs in which authors present how Slovenia quickly after independence created goals for its foreign policy and that final goals were successful European and NATO integration (Rupel, Trekman, Jazbec, Golob, 2000). Another international cooperation Croatia has established with the international community, which was at first excluded from the aforementioned economic and political integration with the EU, is cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). At the time ICTY took over the responsibility for the war crimes that occurred on the territory of the SFR Yugoslavia.

Slovenia and Croatia's main goal in foreign policy was identical. The last chapter presents the situation not only in terms of production of strategic documents, but also the overall position of both countries within the European community. The research was not able to introduce the military sector goals in the same way as it did for foreign relations. In terms of strategic development, the thesis has presented numerous impediments to this process which Slovenia and Croatia have both faced. However, Slovenia and Croatia in the beginning of the 1990's, with the newly gained independence, could execute strategic planning far better than both countries did at that time. The Slovenian instability in the defence sector, as the minister Grizold pointed out, could be better. Croatia faced the same problems, but with

different characteristics, as their process was restricted to the influence of their president Tuđman (see Vukadinović and Čehulić). Slovenia and Croatia faced the inconsistency and problems with how to behave to create and achieve the long-term goals when the countries became independent.

Analysis: Slovenia 1991 – 1999

Analysis begins with the post-independence period in Slovenia, focusing on five available documents prepared for its defence and security sector. The first one is a Defence Act approved by the Slovenian National Assembly in 1994. The second document is the military doctrine from 1995. This document has never been published publicly. I analysed it from an article prepared by Ivan Herbert Kukec who was an advisor to the Chief of the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces at the time. His comments on the military doctrine were published in the first edition of the newspaper *Vojstvo* published by the Slovenian Ministry of Defence in 1996. The third document is a Resolution on the Basis for a National Security Plan of the Republic of Slovenia, passed in the National Assembly in 1993³. I analysed the updated version of the document, which was accepted by the National Assembly in 1994. The fourth document from this period is the National Strategy for Integration of the Republic of Slovenia into NATO. This document was prepared by the Slovenian government in 1998. The last document is the Declaration on the foreign policy of the Republic of Slovenia from 1999. These four documents are the only relevant documents I was able to track. In 1991, the National Assembly also passed the Foreign Affairs Act, but it is missing the strategic aspect. The documents from this period were created in the light of

³ I was not able to find an official English translation of the resolution. Official name in Slovenian language is Resolucija o izhodiščih zasnove nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije.

independency and building up previously non-existent systems. The most important non-existent system was the Slovenian Army. The narrative is thus linked more towards the international building of relations and giving a clear sign that Slovenia's goal is European integration.

Goal(s) of the use of force

In the analysed documents, there are two documents mentioning more precisely what the goals of the use of force are. One such important document issued by the Slovenian political leadership in the 1990's was a Resolution on the Basis for a National Security Plan of the Republic (RBNSPRS). This was the first document with strategic means for the Slovenian defense and security forces. The role of the Slovenian Army is seen purely as self-defensive. Also, the role of non-violent action in order to prevent conflicts is emphasized in the document (RBNSPRS, 1993).

The military doctrine is based on the RBNSPRS. In the military doctrine, the Slovenian Army is described as a defensive force the main goal of which is to as quickly as possible divert the enemy from the territory of the Republic of Slovenia (Kukec, 1996). The doctrine says: "The Slovenian Army will only lead a defensive war." (Kukec, 1996:49). The Slovenian Army, judging by the comments made by Kukec, did not have a plan to operate in foreign countries except in the case of international operations under the UN. The Slovenian government also reserves the right to send the Slovenian Army to foreign countries for protection and rescue operations within the humanitarian framework (Kukec, 1996). The Defence Act from 1994 primarily defines the goals of the use of force to protect the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia (Defence Act, 1994).

Definition of enemies and/or security threats

None of the documents in this period defines enemies. In the RBNSPRS, the threat from the area of former SFR Yugoslavia is described as the biggest threat to the Slovenian national security. Nevertheless, the RBNSPRS is not excluding the socioeconomic position of the Eastern Europe and the possible failure of furthered integration of the region which could result with armed conflicts. Another interesting threat named in the RBNSPRS are potential conflicts due to the unsolved questions of borders. Internal threats in RBNSPRS is international crime, terrorist threats and violent and non-violent threats to the Slovenian constitution (RBNSPRS, 1993).

The comments of Kuček on the military doctrine from 1995 are illuminating the potential danger from the Balkan. In the beginning of the 1990's the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was still in its full spread. The danger of moving the battlefields to Slovenia in possible retreat of one of the armies from the Croatian territory was still probable (Kuček, 1996).

Preferred institutional framework

Without a doubt Slovenia's main goal in the 1990s was to begin the process of NATO integration. This position was confirmed by the National Strategy for Integration of the Republic of Slovenia into NATO (NSIRSN). In the same document Slovenian participation in the UN, OSCE, WTO, CEFTA, EFTA is predicted as well (NSIRSN, 1998). Slovenia did sign the PfP with NATO in 1994 and in 1997 the Slovenian Army started to participate in the

SFOR mission. In the year 1999, the Slovenian Army also began its participation in the NATO missions in Kosovo (KFOR) and Macedonia (NATO HQSk) (Slovenska vojska, n.d. -a and Slovenska vojska, n.d. -b).

At the same time, there were some restraints at the Ministry of Defence. These restraints were aimed towards relations with Russia as Slovenia did not have a history of bad relations and maintaining good relations with Russia would be beneficial for Slovenian interests (Kukec, 1996). Slovenia's official position was that the main goal was NATO integration. Slovenia must build and maintain positive relationships with its neighbouring countries with a clear goal of staying secure in the long-term. Slovenian participation in the collective defence is clearly stated in the Declaration on the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (DFPRS, 1999).

RBNSPRS mentions only Slovenia's role in the international community and stresses Slovenian cooperation with the UN to prevent conflicts through non-violent means (RBNSPRS, 1993).

Method of applying force

In the military doctrine from 1995 the "material means, ability and the structure will be adjusted to the standards of NATO" (Kukec, 1996:32). The Slovenian Army is prepared to fight in all geographical specifics of Slovenia. The Slovenian Army is also prepared to fight guerrilla warfare if the country becomes partially or completely occupied and partisan warfare when occupation of the country or territory is not fully established (Kukec, 1996). The NSIRSN document also predicts wide scale reforms of the permanent structure of the Slovenian Army along with the restructuring of the command sector of the Ministry of

Defense. All this restructuring is done to meet the standards set by NATO (NSIRSN, 1998). Other documents do not mention how force is applied, except for the already mentioned non-violent actions that are carried out through international institutions.

Analysis: 2000 – 2004

In this period Slovenia's international reputation had already been established. Slovenia was involved in numerous international activities and its defence forces were ready to enter NATO. Analysis encompass accessible documents from the year 2000 until 2004. My decision to analyse a relatively short time period is based on the analysis value of the documents available from this period as the analysis later will be able to better present the consequences of NATO accession for the Slovenian defence and security sectors. The regional aspect became more stabilised and the previous threat of unsuccessful integration in the region and beyond in the East practically diminished. The Slovenian Army gained experience from participating in the NATO international missions in BIH (SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR) and Macedonia (NATO HQSk). In 2003 Slovenia entered the NATO mission ISAF in Afghanistan which showed Slovenian preparedness to become a NATO member state (Slovenska vojska, n.d. -c).

The Slovenian expectation of becoming a NATO member increased due to the stable performance of the Slovenian Army with the international and regional partners. The biggest challenge for the Slovenian Army was the restructuring of its forces.

Not only Slovenia, but also other countries who were invited in 2002 to become NATO members (Slovakia, Romania, Latvia, etc.), had to restructure its forces from the Cold War structure to the modern armies' structure according to NATO standards. Some of these

countries, such as Slovenia and Latvia, similarly faced the challenge of non-existent independent armies at the beginning of their independency (Edmunds, 2003).

The analysed documents are: Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (2001), Defence Strategy (2001), Strategic Defence Review 2002/2003 with the vision until 2015 (2004), Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2003 (2004), Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2015 (2004).

Goal(s) of the use of force

The Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia from 2001 (RNSSRS 01) predicts to use preventive diplomacy for conflict prevention. The RNSSRS 01 gives an important emphasis of diplomacy in terms of strengthening the national security position of Slovenia. At the same time, the document gives an important role to the Slovenian Army. There is an interesting goal written in the document. The defence and preservation of the national identity is stated as a crucial goal of the national security politics (RNSSRS 01, 2001). The Defence Strategy made in 2001 determines the main goal of the use of force to divert the enemy from an attack on Slovenia (Defence Strategy, 2001). The similar goal is more thoroughly described in the Strategic Defence Review 2002/2003 with the vision until 2015 (SDR 02/03), where the main goal is to prevent any aggression towards the Republic of Slovenia. In case of aggression quick and efficient measures by the Slovenian Military shall be imposed. The main goal of these measures is to divert an enemy from the further use of military means together with the Slovenian allies (SDR 02/03). The Defence

Strategy determines “active participation” in the international community to strengthen peace and stability in the world (Defence Strategy, 2001).

Definition of enemies and/or security threats

The present documents do not define any specific enemies. SDR 02/03 views the biggest threats from: “the international organized crime, illegal immigrations, international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” (SDR 02/03, 2004: 12). The RNSSRS 01 for the first time implements as threats non-military sources which pose to Slovenia danger equivalent to the traditional military sources. The resolution does not predict widespread armed conflicts as possible at the time. Cybersecurity and energy security are mentioned for the first time as important for Slovenia and an attack on critical infrastructure is a security threat (RNSSRS, 2001).

Preferred institutional framework for the use of force

All of the analysed documents refer to the NATO framework as the main aspect of the international military cooperation of Slovenia. The primary goal of Slovenia at the time was still to become a member state of the EU and NATO (RNSSRS, 2001; SDR 02/03, 2004; Defence Strategy, 2001). The RNSSRS 01, sees a key component in including the Slovenian industry and science in the process of equipping the Slovenian Army. These two potentials shall be introduced to the international partners in the EU and NATO community (RNSSRS, 2001). “Republic of Slovenia as a small country with limited resources must ensure the long-

term security with the constructive cooperation with neighbouring countries and with Euroatlantic integration.” (SDR 02/03, 2004:13). The last quote from the SDR 02/03 represents how Slovenia was ready at the time to enter the EU and NATO, not only for the potential economic development, but also for entering into the collective defence, the structure of which is in Slovenia’s favour thanks to the limits the country faces. The role of the UN is mentioned in the documents, mainly in terms of preventive diplomacy and spreading the values of democracy, respect for international law and ecology (SDR 02/03, 2004).

In the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2003 (ARMD 2003), other aspects of Slovenia’s international and regional cooperation are listed as well as an important milestone in Slovenian international military cooperation. Slovenia elevated its role in OSCE and regional cooperation with Croatia (ARMD, 2003). The period just before the NATO accession was orientated toward the further integration of Slovenian cooperation in the region and with towards the one remaining goal, accession into the EU.

Method of applying force

The documents made by the Ministry of Defence mostly speak about structural reforms with the vision of a modern military system which can integrate into the international military community and represent Slovenian defence interests. The Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2015 (RGLTDEPSAF 2004) predicts further integration into the NATO system with an increased response time of Slovenian Army units. The document until 2006 predicts that the Slovenian Army will be able to provide a motorized battalion within 90 days of battle

readiness. The strategy goes further and sets a goal of a motorized-infantry battalion within the 90 days of battle readiness until 2009. The RGLTDEPSAF 2004 also foresees the development of other units according to the needs of the NATO alliance (RGLTDEPSAF 2004, 2004). The Slovenian Army fulfills the Slovenian interests which is primarily a stable South-eastern Europe. Slovenia, with its military capabilities, is involved in a variety of peacekeeping mission in the Balkans with 200 members of the Slovenian Army (SDR 02/03, 2004). The RNSSRS 2001 emphasises that Slovenian interests in the globalised world are fulfilled by cooperation in regional and international organizations according to Slovenian capabilities (RNSSRS, 2001).

In this period, we can trace the coherency of Slovenian strategic behaviour as all the strategic documents needed were produced, therefore Slovenia was able to create a coherent defence policy, foreign policy and national security strategy. All of the documents are based on the national security strategy, which was not true for the previous period and presented the biggest challenge for the Slovenian experts to produce a coherent strategy.

Analysis: 2005 – 2017

The following period is the most pluralistic one in terms of strategic documents, not only because the time period is significantly larger than the two-time periods analysed before in this thesis. One could argue that these documents are produced due to the successful Slovenian integration into the EU and NATO, but I argue based on the content of these documents that the Slovenian strategic behaviour finally became not only coherent, but more importantly, the Slovenian strategic behaviour became mature. By the term “mature” I mean that this behaviour has produced results on time and suits the needs of the Slovenian defence and security interests.

Since NATO accession Slovenia's only remaining transitional goal was EU accession. With the EU and NATO membership Slovenia established itself as a reliable partner in regional and international cooperation. What predominantly interests me in the analysis in this time period is how the NATO and EU accession affected Slovenian strategic thinking and planning.

The government of Slovenia also accepted the military doctrine in 2006. This is the first published military doctrine and the second military doctrine adopted in Slovenia.

Not all of the available documents are analysed for this period as a lot of available documents are periodic for two years and thus no significant changes have been made in them, while the changes that were made can be traced in other documents. Slovenia in the given timeframe was successful in international missions under either the EU or NATO framework.

The analysed documents come from a variety of state sectors. The production of strategic documents was also steady in the time of political crisis when Slovenia dealt with the financial crisis and political instability (2013 – 2015).

Analysis includes the following documents: Mid-long Defence Programme 2005 – 2010 (2005), Military Doctrine (2006), Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2005 (2006), Defence Sector Strategic Review 2009 (2009), Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (2010), Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces until 2025 (2010), Strategy of the Participation of the Republic of Slovenia in International Operations and Mission (2010), Defence Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (2012), Mid-long Defence Programme of the Republic of Slovenia 2013 – 2018 (2013), Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence For 2014 (2015), Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2015 (2016), Strategic Defence Review 2016 (2016).

Goal(s) of the use of force

The Military Doctrine sees the purpose of the Slovenian Army as: “together with allies averts military aggression against the Republic of Slovenia, contributes to international peace and stability, executes military defence of the Republic of Slovenia, establishes the sovereignty [of the Republic of Slovenia] on the whole territory.” (Furlan et al, 2006). The Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia from 2010 (RNSSRS 2010) defines its primary goals into two groups. In the first group are “living interests”; this group can be summarized as the goals of maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of Slovenia. The second group contains interests termed as “strategic interests”. This group’s goal are maintaining the Slovenian democratic political system, human rights, welfare state etc. The resolution declares that Slovenia will pursue its interests by its own resources and through institutions Slovenia is part of (RNSSRS 2010, 2010). I should add that in the RNSSRS 2010 there is mention of Slovenian foray into international waters. This is the result of a dispute over the maritime border with Croatia⁴.

The international cooperation of Slovenia is presented as preventing the spillover effect with the conflict-affected regions. The approach of Slovenia to promote the values of the EU and NATO is comprehensible. With the Slovenian forces Slovenia strengthens the peace process and democracy in the countries where Slovenia is present within the international cooperation framework (SPRSIOM, 2010).

The Slovenian Army also participates in civil defence, therefore the development of capabilities for civil defence in case of natural disasters or other situations that endanger

⁴ This will be the challenge for the Slovenian diplomacy and Slovenian security and defence forces as the Arbitrary court in Hague awarded majority of Piran bay to Slovenia and defined as Slovenian internal waters. Such defined zone gives Slovenia full control, but Croatia is not recognizing the Arbitrary process as the process was contaminated for Croatia.

civilians within the territory of Slovenia as written in the Resolution on the General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces until 2025 (RGLTDEPSAF until 2025) and in other documents (RGLTDEPSAF until 2025, 2010; RNSSRS, 2010 and Furlan et al, 2006).

Definition of enemies and/or security threats

None of the analysed documents in this period defines an enemy. As the danger of attack in the close future is not predicted, this possibility has declined even further (compared to the previously analysed period) with Slovenian integration into the NATO alliance. The emphasis on international terrorism became greater in the documents from this period. Not only international terrorism, but also non-state and non-military actors are more deeply defined in terms of the possible danger they present to the Slovenian defence and security interests.

The biggest threats defined in the Military Doctrine are the threats Slovenia is facing as a member state of the EU and NATO (Furlan et al, 2006). International organized crime and the infamous Balkan route through which criminal activities such as illegal immigration, drugs, weapons, etc. are transferred. Slovenia as a society with a developed IT infrastructure is vulnerable to hybrid warfare through attacks which could disrupt or use sensitive data for illegal activities (Furlan et al, 2006). Other threats mentioned in the Military Document are connected with the global phenomena such as global warming and its negative effects which Slovenia and its allies could face (Furlan et al, 2006).

The previously mentioned global threats endangering Slovenia and Slovenia's allies are more clearly defined in the RNSSRS 2010. These zones are where non-state and non-military actors are producing transnational negative effects: "Western Balkan, Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, Middle and Far East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. "(RNSSRS 2010, 2010: 9). Other documents up to this point have all mentioned written threats. The Defence Strategy from 2012 (DS 2012) also mentions the possible threats of forbidden practises related to conventional and nuclear arms. The Defence Strategy also ads for the first-time threats related to public healthcare (DS 2012, 2012).

Preferred institutional framework for the use of force

The Military Doctrine declares Slovenian partnership with the UN, EU, NATO and other regional organisations, but the document is not more exact on how Slovenia participates in the UN. Meanwhile the document is very thorough on the preparedness of the Slovenian Armed Forces and their compatibility with the Alliance (Furlan et al, 2006). It is evident that Slovenia has incorporated the collective defence system; meanwhile UN cooperation remains on a more symbolic level in terms of spreading the UN's values. Additional evidence backing up this claim is the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2005 (ARMD 2005), which does not mention UN cooperation at all, while cooperation with NATO, the EU and OSCE is explained in the detail (ARMD 2005, 2006). Nevertheless, the integration into the defence and security system of the EU and NATO has its consequences.

A persistent problem has been the inability to introduce Slovenian interests into the agendas of NATO and EU. Slovenia only participates in the proposed programmes of other members,

while Slovenian interests are not making headways into the Euro- Atlantic cooperation (SDR 2009, 2009).

Further integration into the Euro-Atlantic connection is set as a main objective. In this time period, it is evident that Slovenia's military capabilities are developed according to the socioeconomic reality of Slovenia. This is a process of the previously described restructuring project of the Slovenian Armed Forces and embrace of the collective defence in which the Slovenian Armed Forces participate by developing units according to the needs of the EU and NATO.

The method of applying force

Slovenia's response to threats is comprehensively written in the RNSSRS 2010. In the sector of counterterrorism, Slovenia's obligation is the implementation of legal measures decided on the international level (UN, EU, NATO and other international organisations). At the same time Slovenia's cooperation with its international partners will continue in further addressing terrorism efficiently (RNSSRS 2010, 2010). For the first time in Slovenian military history, the Slovenian Army cooperated using its own military ship Triglav. The Italian-led operation Mare Nostrum was a milestone as Slovenia joined this humanitarian operation in order to provide assistance to the Italian Navy (Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2014, 2015). The international cooperation of Slovenia peaked in this analysed time period as Slovenian Armed Forces were involved in numerous operations worldwide. The majority of these operations were peacekeeping missions and humanitarian missions.

The documents predict Slovenian behaviour and actions will help NATO and the EU achieve the goals set at the time. Slovenia will also offer solidarity and assist where additional

resources are needed. Slovenian troops are available and prepared to participate in the NATO RFF programme (SDR 2016, 2016).

Since 2009 great importance has been given to the future reforms of the defence sector. The keyword is rationalization in terms of the budget and structure of the Slovenian Armed Forces Mid-Long Defence Programme of the Republic of Slovenia 2013 – 2018, (2013) and DS 2012, 2012).

Summary of the analysis: Slovenia

This chapter presents key findings that will be later in the thesis compared with the findings of Croatia's analysis. The analysis reveals how Slovenian strategic thinking and planning changed over the years. In the first period from 1991 – 1999, the emphasis of the strategic documents was on Slovenian sovereignty and establishing Slovenia as an international partner. This was important for Slovenia due to the problematic image of the Western Balkan at the time. This period was also mired by the lack of strategic documents and clear vision for the future. This future vision was beholden to Slovenian integration into NATO and EU, but it did not envision a clear strategy of how Slovenia would achieve the reform of the military sector (see Kukec, 1996). Slovenia was focused on Southeast Europe as this region was at the time in an extremely unstable position. Concern over spillover effect resulted in even bigger cooperation with the Slovenian European partners with which Slovenia provided answers to the challenges of the region. With participation in the PfP programme, Slovenia undoubtedly showed that the country envisions itself as part of the Western value system.

The period from 2000 – 2004 was influenced by the EU and NATO accession. The main goal for the Slovenian Armed Forces was the reform and transformation of the defence sector into a modern defence system. The reform and transformation process was heavily influenced by NATO and the EU as the Slovenian Armed Forces had to reach the standards set by these two organisations (see Edmunds, 2003). Plans to achieve interoperability were set as the main goals of the defence sector reform.

Slovenian presence increased during this period as the Slovenian contribution to the international community intensified through the presence of Slovenia in international missions and operations. Southeast Europe was the main source of threat to Slovenian national security as the region in the 1990's was unstable. The Slovenian focus was to help stabilise the region, which is not surprising as Slovenia has a long historical and cultural involvement in this area. Slovenian involvement showed how valuable Slovenia's contribution as one of the smallest NATO and EU member can be. In this period, also the problem of non-state actors occurred and this challenge did not go unanswered by the Slovenian strategic documents. The emphasis on collective defence was present, but compared to the next period from 2005 – 2017, collective defence was still not properly implemented into the strategic plans of Slovenia.

The last analysed period from 2005 – 2017 is the result of a matured Slovenian strategic thinking, which could also produce criticism of planning in the past. The period after NATO and EU accession is marked by Slovenia's full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, but at the same time the country did not manage to implement its interests into the policies of these two organisations. What these interests are remains unknown as the documents do not mention these unrepresented interests anywhere. The documents do not mention the role of the Slovenian Armed Forces in the refugee crisis, but in February 2016 the Slovenian National Assembly, authorised the Slovenian Armed Forces for three months

to have the full authority of the police, which was a precedent in Slovenian history. There was a fruitful public debate regarding whether this is appropriate and needed. Slovenia's size and capabilities in manpower are relatively low and police were not able to provide enough manpower to execute the tasks of protecting the border. Although the Slovenian Armed Forces were not given the authority to patrol the border without a police officer present, this decree still shows the trust Slovenian politics has for the defence sector. This trust has not produced any meaningful budget injections. Slovenian Armed Forces are not prepared for war as the Slovenian president and Commander in Chief, Borut Pahor, estimated in his yearly evaluation of the Slovenian Armed Forces (STA, 2016). The budget cuts during the economic crisis were greatest in the defence sector, which is still waiting for the appropriate budget adjustment to a pre-recession level. This is important to maintain the readiness of the Slovenian Armed Forces and further the specialisation of the military units that can be used within the Euro-Atlantic defence and security sector. Cybersecurity threats are discussed in the documents from this period too, but nowhere is there a list of methods for how the Slovenian security and defence sectors will deal with these threats. Problems are also seen in the terrorism policy as the outlined goals from 2010 were not fulfilled when Slovenia faced its own combatants that travelled to Syria.

Slovenian strategic thinking clearly developed from the problematic circumstances in the SFR Yugoslavia. These problematic circumstances did not stop the process of developing the strategic culture. I would argue these circumstances gave the strategic mindset a chance to test its ideas and strategy to achieve certain goals, which were surely subversive within the framework of the SFR Yugoslavia. When Slovenia gained sovereignty and independence in 1991 the strategic culture in Slovenia was faced with numerous challenges provided by the global situation. The political choice of pursuing Euro-Atlantic integration was backed by the strategic community, which produced strategic documents and prepared the defence and

security sector for reforms and transformation. The development process of strategic culture in Slovenia was influenced at first by setting up the defence sector in the 1990's and later by Euro-Atlantic integration accompanied by Slovenia's new role as an important factor in the stabilisation process of Southeast Europe. One could argue that the Slovenian strategic culture is heavily influenced by the Euro-Atlantic integration's strategies and goals, but one should keep in mind that Slovenia was part of the SFR Yugoslavia and as such was not officially able to develop strategic goals; as we have seen in the case of TO however, this was not the case as unofficially the strategies for the Slovenian defence sector were developed, albeit the under the constraints the strategic community had at the time.

Analysis: Croatia 1991 – 1999

Analysis begins on the Croatian case right after Croatia declared independence. This period produced little to no strategic documents. I therefore rely mainly on secondary sources. The analysis will be limited as there are not enough documents available to conduct an analysis as in the case of Slovenia. Therefore, the analysis rather presents the political situation in Croatia at the time alongside a presentation of how strategic documents later were produced. This will provide a better insight into understanding how the strategic culture developed in Croatia. In this period only legal mechanisms were introduced by the Croatian government, such as the Defence Act from 1991. Croatia failed to produce a single strategic paper in this time period due to numerous reasons. But as presented later in this chapter, it seems this did not pose a significant problem for Croatia in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration. The integration process however was a source of motivation for the Croatian government to start preparing written documents declaring where the strategic mindset of Croatia is set. I have presented the limitations of my research for this period. With these

limitations in mind, the analysis uses the secondary sources in which authors were close to the process of making the Croatian strategic documents and by authors who are experts on Croatia's foreign relations.

The Defence Act was accepted in the Sabor (Croatian National Assembly) in 1991 and was updated in 1993. The act is very technical and has all the regular features of such acts. In the law the duties of Croatian citizens are described, as is the role of the Croatian Armed Forces, etc. At the time when the updated version of the Defence Act was passed, Croatia was still occupied by Serbian forces. The Republic of Serbian Krajina was declared on the occupied territory and it was only recognized by Serbia. I will use the name Serbia for the purpose of greater clarity albeit the official name of the country was still Yugoslavia.

In the Defence Act of 1993, the main purpose of the Croatian Armed Forces is to gather and prepare Croatian citizens for armed battle, protect the sovereignty and independence, and execute tasks in the case of natural disasters (Defence Act, 1993). In the same act, there is also special mention of home guards and the national guard, which were a special part of the Croatian Armed Forces. The Defence Act also established the structure of the Croatian Armed Forces and hierarchy (Defence Act, 1993). Croatian political leadership in 1990 set a focus on its police force (at the time named milica) as the Croatian TO was disarmed. The task of readiness for war in terms of staff and by organising a special task group within the police force was launched (Marijan, 2008). Croatia's decision to organise basic parameters of defence through the Ministry for internal affairs was straightforward as the socialist republics in the SFR Yugoslavia were not able to organise their own militaries. This obstacle was formally bypassed, but these decisions were the results of the internal political struggles in the SFR Yugoslavia. What the federal government and the YPA failed to do in the past, Milošević managed to do in a few years. Part of Croatia's TO did come under the direct control of the YPA as the TO responsible for the territory of the Serbian

Autonomous Oblast of Krajina (SAO Krajina), which was a predecessor of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The TO responsible for the SAO Krajina empowered the unsatisfied Croatian Serbs (Marijan, 2008). The outline of the war in Croatia was therefore different than in Slovenia where the Slovenian TO or at least part of it never came under the control of the YPA.

There is no mention of threats or enemies in the Defence Act. Neither does it mention any international framework. Croatia in the early 1990's participated in international organisations such as the UN and OSCE (at the time CSCE). Croatia's foreign affairs at the time were intense and interests from the international community to resolve the crisis in Croatia and BIH intensified.

The Croatian administration worked closely with the USA. Just a few days after the Washington agreement was signed by Croatia and BIH on 18. 3. 1994, the Croatian foreign minister Gojko Šušak requested military aid from the US, but the request was rejected as the UN embargo was still in place for Croatia and BIH. The US referred the Croatian government to a private company called Military Professional Resources Inc. for technical help. Although the company was private it had close political connections to the Pentagon and the US government (Lukić, 2006). Croatian interests were caught in the middle ground. The international community was slow to act in the Yugoslav war. The interests of the international community were not unified and different actors set the strategy according to their own interests. This fact becomes more evident in the final stages of the Yugoslav conflict when there were different ideas of how the EU and NATO should intervene.

The USA decided at one point not to wait for the European partners and instead they took the decisions into their own hands with an open invitation for European allies to join them. This left some European countries empty handed and their influence over the Yugoslav

crisis reduced (Lukić, 2006). Croatia's close ties with the US were a huge help to the defence sector at the time. Croatia in 1994 was still occupied by Serbia and the conflict was still raging on.

The Republic of Serbian Krajina controlled the "outskirts of Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun Banovina, Eastern and Western Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem." (Barić, 2004:442). One of the most decisive battles in the Croatian war for independence was Operation Storm. This four day long military operation up to this day remains an object of dispute between Serbs and Croats as Serbs considered the operation ethnic cleansing, while Croats vigorously reject such accusations and see Operation Storm as the greatest act in the war. This operation liberated the majority of the land controlled by the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Barić, 2004).

Operation Storm probably was supported by the US as the Clinton administration proposed a new plan for Croatia when Operation Storm was finished and the proposal was non-negotiable for the European partners (Lukić, 2006).

After the war ended Croatia started numerous internationally controlled processes. One of the most important ones and especially significant for the modern democratic government was the process of reintegration of the Danube area back into the Croatian political system. The influence of the US on the Erdut agreement that describes the process of reintegration was enormous and proof of close ties between Croatia and the USA (Bing, 2008).

This was the last important international process on Croatian territory. The war was won without a single strategic document and all the strategic questions' answers were determined by president Tuđman, who relied on his political and historical knowledge (Mahečić, 2010). This decision is not surprising as Croatia exited the war with tremendous consequences and the process of democratization started in the war time.

Croatia as a newly independent country built its defence sector along with the process of building up democratic institutions (Žunec in Bilandžić, 2008). The next period from 2000 until 2009 is marked by Croatia's participation in the PfP and the production of strategic documents. The previously unwritten strategic thinking would for the first time in independent Croatia be written in numerous documents. The path for Croatia's Euro-Atlantic integration opened in 2000 with Croatia's participation in the PfP programme. Croatia had two main objectives for participation in the programme. The first one was to establish the Croatian Armed Forces within the democratic political system and the second was that the Croatian Armed Forces follow the NATO standards (Barić, 2000).

Analysis: Croatia 2000 - 2009

For this time period the research analyses four documents: Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Croatia (2002), Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (2002), Strategic Defence Review (2005), The Croatian Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan 2006 – 2015 (2006). This is far fewer compared to the Slovenian period from 1999 – 2004). Croatia in this period was active in numerous peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in the region and globally. The majority of peacekeeping missions were under the UN, the exception being Croatia's participation in the campaigns in Afghanistan and Kosovo with NATO (MVEP, n.d.).

Goal(s) of the use of force

The Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Croatia 2002 (SNSRC 2002) establishes the goal of building the national security in which the freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia are secured. The document also mentions respect for human rights and ecology as well as the stability of the country (SNSRC 2002, 2002). The Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (DSRC 2002) defines the goals of the use of force more precisely. The document assigns the defence sector responsibility for apprehending all current and future military challenges. The defence sector is a pillar of Croatian society and ensures the development of the democratic process, stability and security. The document predicts military defence as a self-defence type and the Croatian Armed Forces must be prepared to divert the enemy from attack (DSRC 2002, 2002).

Definitions of enemies and/or security threats

The documents do not define any enemy specifically, but there is special mention of FR Yugoslavia (Serbia). Croatia no longer regards the FR Yugoslavia as the enemy, but as a potential partner with whom Croatia can contribute to Southeast Europe's progress and stability (SNSRC 2002, 2002).

Future armed conflicts in the region are diminished. Moreover, there is a prediction that the possibility of war in the region will be abolished in the future. The threats to the security of Croatia are global terrorism and conflicts in North Africa, the Near East and Caucasus (SNSRC 2002, 2002). The Defence Strategy is less optimistic and describes Southeast

Europe as unstable, yet the chance of new conflicts is low. Despite the low chance of new conflicts, the situation can worsen if the processes of transition are not successful (DSRC 2002, 2002).

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR 2005) from 2005 identifies the same threats already mentioned. There is mention of threats in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime (SDR 2005, 2005).

Preferred institutional framework for the use of force

The emphasis on Euro-Atlantic cooperation is strong in all of the analysed documents. Euro-Atlantic integration is the highest priority for Croatia. Croatia also continues with regional cooperation for stabilisation of the region (SNSRC 2002, 2002). Croatian Armed Forces must be prepared to take part in international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under the framework of the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE (DSRC 2002, 2002). Croatia's involvement in collective defence from 2006 intensifies under the plan and Croatian Armed Forces are ready to participate in NATO's Response Force and the EU Battlegroup programmes (The Croatian Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan 2006 – 2015, 2006).

The method of applying force

The notion of collective defence became stronger toward the end of the 2000 – 2009 period. The documents predict interoperability of the Croatian Armed Force within NATO

and the EU's collective defence system. The Croatian defence diplomacy participates with international and regional partners to provide further training and new routes of cooperation (The Croatian Forces Long-Term Development Plan 2006 – 2015, 2006 and SNSRC 2002, 2002). Croatian Armed Forces can deploy numerous small battle groups within 24 hours. The readiness of the armed forces to intervene on Croatian territory and also on foreign territory within the NATO framework is the main aspect of how Croatia could apply force in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR 2005). The SNSRC 2002 mentions Croatia's involvement of the Croatian Armed Forces in the humanitarian mission in BIH (IFOR/SFOR) and with the continuing process of interoperability within the Euro-Atlantic integration such participation is expected to be intensified in the future (SNSRC 2002, 2002).

Analysis: 2010 – 2017

In this period, the Croatian process of Euro-Atlantic integration was successfully completed. All of the major objectives in the Croatian foreign affairs were realised by Croatia's membership in NATO and the EU. Success did not produce a continuation of the process set at the beginning of the 2000's. The production of strategic documents practically stopped and the security and defence sector was officially left only with the strategies made a decade prior.

The Croatian Defence Act was updated in 2013 and there were few other documents made, but the majority of them are short-term strategies of the ministry of defence where one can be informed about small changes made in the defence sector. Despite the lack of new strategic papers, Croatia's cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic integration did not diminish. Croatian Armed Forces in this period participate in numerous peacekeeping and humanitarian

missions in the region and the World. For this period, the analysis examines the following documents: The Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Defence for 2011 – 2013 (2010), The Defence Act (2013), Strategic Defence Review (2013), The Croatian Forces Long-Term Development Plan for 2015 – 2024 (2014), The Revised Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Defence for 2016 – 2018 (2016). There were other documents available, but none of them carries any significantly different content to the analysed documents.

Goal(s) of the use of force

The Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Defence for 2011 – 2013 (SPMOD 11/13) does not provide any new goals for the use of force except the protection of Croatian maritime interests. Arguably this could be a consequence of border disputes Croatia has with its neighbours.

The interoperability of the Croatian Armed Forces is recognized as a significant goal in order to participate in collective defence. Heightened readiness of the Croatian Armed Forces is predicted. The main strategy of defence has not changed and aversion of the enemy is maintained as a strategy for the Croatian Armed Forces (SPMOD 11/13, 2010).

Strategic Defence Review (SDR 2013) sets the main goals as executing the tasks set within the system of the collective defence, while the same traditional goals such as protecting sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Croatia remain the same as in the previous documents. There is mention of asymmetrical and unconventional threats. These threats are answered in the framework of the collective defence. Croatia's goal of peacekeeping and humanitarianism remain unaltered and participation in assisting allies remains foreseen (SDR 2013, 2013).

The Croatian Armed Forces also assist civil institutions and citizens in extraordinary situations (The Croatian Forces Long-Term Development Plan for 2015 – 2024, 2014).

Preferred institutional framework for the use of force

The significance of the collective defence is high in all of the analysed documents. All of the documents predict the mechanism of collective defence as among the most important pillars of defence. The SDR 2013 affirms the collective defence as a necessary component to the Croatian Armed Forces due to the asymmetrical threats that cannot be answered solely by one country (SDR 2013, 2013). The importance of the UN is regarded as symbolic, as the documents mention the peacekeeping mission briefly; cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic community has a comparatively greater role. The Revised Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Defence for 2016 – 2018 (RSPMOD 16/18) discusses how Croatia can contribute in the future to upgrade its collective defence through defence diplomacy (RSPMOD 16/18, 2016).

The method of applying force

The documents display a general tendency toward a topic of restructuring and reforming the Croatian Armed Forces. Likewise, the topic of international cooperation of the Croatian Armed Forces is mentioned too in all of the analysed documents. A bit more specific is SDR 2013, in which the further modernization and development of different sectors within the Croatian Armed Forces are mentioned. The development of different

divisions of the Croatian Armed Forces is predicted to achieve greater readiness, effective response to threats and interoperability in collective defence mechanism (SDR 2013, 2013).

Summary of the analysis: Croatia

Croatia's development of strategic culture was burdened by numerous factors in the 1990's. The raging war and the reconstruction of the country left no resources or manpower to write strategies for the Croatian security and defence sector. The Defence Act was the single written available document with any potential strategic value. In the mid 1990's Croatia remained occupied. Later, the role of the USA was enormous in Croatia's foreign policy. Due to the political circumstances, the strategic documents start to develop in early 2000's. The embrace of Western values and Euro-Atlantic integration occurred in the 1990's and was officially written down in these documents. The second analysed period reconfirms the main objectives of Croatia and defines Croatia's role in the region and in the World. Croatia's involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions since the late 1990's reaffirmed Croatia's willingness to participate in the Euro-Atlantic community.

The second period from 2000 – 2009 was the period of Croatia's path towards NATO and EU accession. In the light of stabilisation and normalisation of political relations between Croatia and Serbia, strategic documents regard Serbia as a potential partner of Croatia. Nevertheless, this sentence in reality can prove to be positive thinking rather than reality, as progress in political relations is still seen. The mechanism of collective defence is a central pillar of Croatian defence, alongside the future development of the Croatian Armed Forces according to the needs and standards of Euro-Atlantic integration. The regional aspect for this

period of time is for Croatia to be considered non-problematic; Croatia's ability and knowledge can offer further contributions to the stabilisation process of Southeast Europe.

The final analysed period lasted from 2010 – 2017. This period can be described as stagnation in terms of strategic planning. The documents were produced, but a long-anticipated military doctrine has still not been written. The further plan of rationalisation, restructuring and interoperability of the Croatian Armed Forces is established. This period also failed to produce a new strategy for national security, the last one having been written in 2002. Previously high expectations of the collective defence system went even higher in this period. Croatia's plan is to use diplomacy to influence the future development of the collective defence. The main goal for the future is to increase the readiness of the Croatian Armed Forces and to continue with the development of different divisions of the Croatian Armed Forces.

After declaring the independence, Slovenia and Croatia orientated themselves towards the West and cooperated with the international community and international institutions. Both countries have similar attitude towards the collective defence and try to find how through means of diplomacy Slovenia and Croatia could represent their interests within the Euro-Atlantic community. Although the analysed documents are quite abstract what are these interests. In the table below, there are highlighted most important results gained by the analysis.

Slovenian period	Slovenia	Croatia
Croatian period		
1991 - 1999	Slovenia's orientation towards the West is set after the end of war in 1991. Slovenia joins numerous international organisations and programs, such as OECD, Partnership for Peace.	After the war ends in 1995, Croatia reaffirms the orientation towards the West. Lacking strategic documents due to political factors and reconstruction of the country after the war.
1991 - 1999		
2000 – 2004	Slovenia in this period is positioned as the EU and NATO candidate. Strategic documents are focused on reforms of the defence sector. The emphasis on collective defence is present. The important regional role of Slovenia developed further in this period through international and regional cooperation.	Croatia produces a number of documents with strategic value and consolidates its role within the Euro-Atlantic community. Collective defence is seen as the pillar of Croatia's defence system. The process of modernization and transformation of the defence sector begins. Ties with Serbia are normalised and Croatia's regional role is developed further.
2000 - 2009		
2005 - 2017	Interoperability of the armed forces is set as one of the main priorities. Further modernisation of the defence force is predicted.	Lack of long-term strategic perspective is present for this period. Rationalisation and interoperability of the armed forces marks this period. Goal of influencing the future development of the collective defence is set.
2010 - 2017		

Conclusion

In my thesis, I have presented the Slovenian and Croatian positions in recent history. By doing so I have offered a historical analysis that can provide an explanation on the circumstances of Slovenian and Croatian strategic thinking in the SFR Yugoslavia. Both countries underwent the process of democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration. The paths both countries took were different and challenged with different obstacles. Nevertheless, some obstacles, such as the international recognition of both countries, were shared between these two countries. Both countries, after they gained independence, positioned the Euro-Atlantic integration as a major objective. The Euro-Atlantic integration was seen as the pillar of a stable future and development of Slovenia and Croatia.

In the 1990's both countries decided to organise their defence on two principles that are still used today. The first one is the principle of self-defence and the second one is the principle of averting danger from its territory. The collective defence principle later implemented in the policies of both countries is seen by Slovenia and Croatia as the guarantee of their future safety and conflict resolution. Nevertheless, Slovenia and Croatia both share the emphasis on diplomacy and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Analysed documents predict use of force only in case of self-defence or in terms of collective defence, yet Slovenia's stance is more traceable in the strategic documents with a more detailed perspective than Croatia's.

Based on my research and analysis I can confirm my hypothesis: "The development of Slovenian and Croatian strategic cultures after independence was heavily influenced by both countries' goals of achieving Euro-Atlantic integration". The development of strategic culture in both countries was significantly marked by the Euro-Atlantic integration's principles and values. The idea of collective defence is embraced in all of the major strategic

documents since the 1990's regarding the security and defence sectors. Both countries see their role as complementary to other partners in the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The regional aspect is emphasised more in Slovenian documents. This not a surprise as Slovenia is seen as the middle ground between the countries of Central Europe and those on the Balkan peninsula. Croatia's regional cooperation is represented by different humanitarian missions in BIH and Kosovo. Both countries never diminished the importance of regional stability in their documents, although as the region became more stabilised the documents by both countries still mention further development of the region. One could argue that due to historical relations Southeast Europe is less stable than the strategic documents by Slovenia and Croatia present. The role within the Euro-Atlantic community is for both countries essential, which is clearly shown in planning the participation of both countries' armed forces in the missions and military operations abroad.

This thesis was limited by a lot of factors. Therefore, I have conducted research on available documents made by the strategic community in both countries. These documents are sometimes missing the details of the ideas expressed in them. Despite this fact I can conclude that these documents provide enough evidence for my analysis to be valid. My research focused on how basic strategic thinking was shaped in both countries since independence. The differences between Slovenian and Croatian strategic cultures are probably existing as both countries have their own interests and different historical experiences. Nevertheless, this difference in the analysed documents is not traceable enough to conclude what these differences are. I can conclude that both countries shared features in their strategic thinking and planning, which was influenced by the beginning of their independence in the 1990's and by the Euro-Atlantic integration and values set by the Euro-Atlantic alliance.

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Thesis Project

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Thesis Project

Proposed title of the Thesis: Progressive divergence? The development of Croatian and Slovenian strategic cultures since independence.

Supervisor: JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D

Object: The main objective of the thesis is to discover the basic notions of the strategic culture.

The research will examine how the strategic culture of Slovenia and Croatia has developed since both countries became independent. Another interest of the thesis is to explore how the Euro-Atlantic integration influenced the development of the strategic culture in Slovenia and Croatia.

Theoretical background: The thesis will introduce numerous theoretical perspectives on strategic culture. The research will understand the concept as the first generation of

researchers did. The decision is based on limitations on research of strategic culture in countries such as Slovenia and Croatia.

Hypothesis: The development of Slovenian and Croatian strategic culture after independence was heavily influenced by both countries' goals to achieve Euro-Atlantic integration.

Thesis: The thesis will present the concept of strategic culture from various theoretical perspectives. Slovenia and Croatia were both part of the SFR Yugoslavia. Shared history will be considered in the thesis. To better understand the development of the strategic culture after gained independence, background and role of Slovenia and Croatia within the SFR Yugoslavia's defence system will be examined. In particular the system of territorial defence will be examined as the territorial defence was one of the rare mechanisms of the SFR Yugoslavia's defence system that was controlled by the federal states and not by the federal government. The research will be based on analysis of various official documents and secondary articles.

Methodology: I will analyse the official documents with the method used by Jan Beneš and Tomáš Karasek in their article *Small and Vulnerable? Stability and Change in Strategic Culture of Visegrad Countries*. The analysis will examine four fields: "goal(s) of the use of force, definition of enemies and/or security threats, preferred institutional framework for the use of force, and the method of applying force." (Beneš and Karasek, 2016: 11).

Provisional outline:

- Introduction
- Theory and methodology
- The Concept of Strategic Culture
- Slovenia and Croatia's role in SFR Yugoslavia's defence system

- Analysis: Slovenia
- Analysis: Croatia
- Conclusion

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